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Abstract
Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no system-theoretic comprehension
of how a compromised agent can leverage communication capabilities to maximize the damage in distributed multi-agent systems. A
rigorous analysis of cyber-physical attacks enables us to increase the system awareness against attacks and design more resilient control
protocols. To this end, we will take the role of the attacker to identify the worst effects of attacks on root nodes and non-root nodes in
a distributed control system. More specifically, we show that a stealthy attack on root nodes can mislead the entire network to a wrong
understanding of the situation and even destabilize the synchronization process. This will be called the internal model principle for the
attacker and will intensify the urgency of designing novel control protocols to mitigate these types of attacks.
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1 Introduction
A cyber-physical system (CPS) refers to a relatively new
generation of systems that integrates computation, network-
ing, and physical processes. Based on the control objectives,
CPSs can be classified into two categories. The first class,
called the networked control system (NCS), is a large-scale,
but single-agent distributed system, wherein sensors, actua-
tors, and controllers are distributed across the system, and the
control loops are closed through a real-time communication
network [1–4]. The global objective in a NCS is to assure
that the output of the system tracks a predefined trajectory
or regulates to the origin. The second class, called the multi-
agent system (MAS), which is the problem of interest in this
paper, is composed of a set of dynamical agents that are in-
teracting with each other to achieve a coordinated operation
and behavior [5–10]. Despite their numerous applications in
a variety of disciplines, distributed MASs are vulnerable to
CPS attacks. In contrast to other adversarial inputs, such as
disturbances and noises, attacks are intentionally planned to
maximize the harm the system or even destabilize it. To de-
velop resilient control protocols for optimal risk mitigation,
performance assurance, and survivability in uncertain and
changing networked environments, a science for modeling
of adversarial behaviors and threats is required.
Several results have been reported on the severe damages
of CPS attacks on NCSs [11–18] and many approaches have
been proposed for attack mitigation or detection in these
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systems [19–24]. The effects of attacks on distributed MASs
can be even more serious and difficult to detect compared
to NCSs, as the source of the attack might be some com-
promised neighbors, not the agent itself. Despite its impor-
tance, there is no rigorous and mathematical framework to
characterize conditions under which an attacker maximizes
the damage to the network and, for example, destabilizes
the synchronization or consensus in MASs. Attack detection
and mitigation techniques for MASs have been developed in
the literature [25–35]. Most of the mentioned mitigation ap-
proaches use the discrepancy among agents and their neigh-
bors or the exact state of agents to detect and mitigate the
effect of the attacker. However, we will show that a stealthy
attack on a root node can cause an emergent misbehavior in
the network with no discrepancy between agents’ states, and
thus, existing mitigation approaches do not work. Moreover,
this discrepancy could be as a result of a legitimate change
in the state of an agent and blindly rejecting its informa-
tion can harm the network connectivity and, consequently,
convergence of the network. Therefore, rigorous analysis of
attacks on MASs is required to identify the worst effects of
attacks and highlight the urgency of designing novel resilient
control protocols.
In this paper, we rigorously analyze the effects of attacks
on a distributed MAS. It is first shown mathematically that
adversarial inputs launched on a single agent can snowball
into a much larger andmore catastrophic one. Conditions un-
der which an attacker can destabilize the entire synchroniza-
tion are found. This is called the internal model principle for
the attacker. The internal model principle is well established
for distributed output synchronization of MASs [36–38]. It
says that [39] the system needs to incorporate the dynamics
of the reference or disturbance into its dynamic to achieve
perfect tracking or disturbance rejection. The attacker, on
the other hand, can identify a root node and incorporate a
natural mode of the agents dynamics into the design of its
attack signal to destabilize the network. This natural mode
can be obtained by eavesdropping and monitoring the sen-
sory data without having knowledge of the agents dynamics.
Conditions under which the local neighborhood tracking er-
ror becomes zero despite attack is also found. This shows
that existing disturbance attenuation techniques [40,41] that
attempt to minimize the effect of disturbance on the local
neighborhood tracking error do not work in the presence of
stealthy attacks in which the attacker has the knowledge of
the agent dynamics and the network topology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents some preliminaries on graph theory and consensus
of distributed MAS. In Section 3, the distributed consensus
of MASs under attack is analyzed using frequency response
and graph-theoretic approaches. Section 4 uses the results
of Section 3 to provide a thorough discussion on the adverse
effects of attacks on distributed MASs. Finally, a simulation
example and the conclusion are presented in Sections 5 and
6, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, the preliminaries of the graph theory and
consensus of the distributed multi-agent system (MAS) are
provided.
2.1 Graph Theory
A directed graph G consists of a pair (V,E) in which
V = {v1, · · · , vN } is a set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is a
set of edges. The adjacency matrix is defined as E =
[
ei j
]
,
with ei j > 0 if (v j, vi) ∈ E, and ei j = 0 otherwise. The set
of nodes vi with edges incoming to node v j is called the
neighbors of node vi , namely Ni = {v j : (v j, vi) ∈ E} . The
graph Laplacian matrix is defined as L = D − E, where
D = diag(di) is the in-degree matrix, with di =
∑
j∈Ni
ei j
as the weighted in-degree of node vi. A (directed) tree is a
connected digraph where every node, except the root node,
has the in-degree of one. A graph is said to have a spanning
tree if a subset of edges forms a directed tree.
Throughout the paper, λA denotes the eigenvalue of matrix
A, the Kronecker product of matrices A and B is A ⊗ B and
diag (A1, . . . , An) represents a block diagonal matrix with
matrices Ai , i = 1, . . . , n as its diagonal entries. Finally, 1N
is the N-vector of ones and Im(R) and ker(R) denote the
range space and the null space of R, respectively.
Assumption 1. The communication graph has a spanning
tree.
2.2 Standard Distributed Consensus in MASs
In this subsection, consensus for a leaderless MAS is re-
viewed. Consider N agents with identical dynamics given by
x˙i = Axi + Bui , (1)
where xi ∈ R
n and ui ∈ R
m denote the system state and the
control input, respectively. Matrices A and B are the drift
and input dynamics, respectively. It is assumed that (A, B)
is stabilizable.
Define the distributed local state variable control protocol
for each node as [42]
ui = cK
∑
j∈Ni
ei j
(
x j − xi
)
, (2)
where c > 0 denotes the scalar coupling gain, K ∈ Rm×n is
the feedback control gain matrix and ei j is the (i, j)-th entry
of the graph adjacency matrix.
Using (1) and (2), the global dynamic of agents becomes
x˙ = (IN ⊗ A − cL ⊗ BK) x , (3)
where x =
[
xT
1
, . . . , xT
N
]T
∈ RNn×1 and L denotes the graph
Laplacian matrix. The solution of (3) is obtained by
x(t) = e(IN⊗A−cL⊗BK)tx(0) . (4)
Let K be designed such that the matrices A − cλiBK, i =
2, . . . ,N be Hurwitz, where λi, i = 2, . . . ,N are the nonzero
eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian matrix L. Then, under
Assumption 1, the final consensus value is [43]
x(t)
∆
=
(
wT ⊗ eAt
)

x1(0)
...
xN(0)

as t → ∞ , (5)
where w =
[
p1, . . . , pN
]T
∈ RN is the left eigenvector of L
associated with the zero eigenvalue and satisfies wT1N = 1.
Assumption 2. The system dynamic A in (1) is marginally
stable, with all eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
3 Distributed Consensus of MASs under Attack
In this section, attacks on distributed MASs are modeled
and their adverse effects on the standard distributed control
protocol are analyzed. Then, the internal model principle for
the attacker is investigated. Finally, attack analysis based on
graph theoretic tools is provided.
3.1 Attack Modeling and Analysis for Distributed MAS
In this subsection, attacks on distributed MASs are mod-
eled and their adverse effects are analyzed.
The actuator attack on agent i can be modeled by
uci = ui + αi u
a
i , (6)
where ui ∈ R
m is the nominal control input, ua
i
∈ Rm is the
attack signal injected into the actuators of the agent i, uc
i
is
the corrupted input applied to the MAS (1) and
αi =

1 Agent i is under actuator attack
0 Otherwise
.
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The sensor attack is modeled as
xci = xi + βi x
a
i , (7)
where xi ∈ R
n is the normal state, xa
i
∈ Rn represents the
attack signal injected into the sensors of the agent i, xc
i
is
the corrupted state and
βi =

1 Agent i is under sensor attack
0 Otherwise
.
Using (6) and (7) in (1) and (2) yields
x˙i = Axi + Bui + B fi , (8)
where fi represents the overall attack injected into the agent
i and is given by
fi = αiu
a
i + cK

∑
j∈Ni
ei j
(
β jx
a
j − βix
a
i
) . (9)
Remark 1. Deception attacks on communication links can
also be modeled the same as attacks on sensors given by
(7) [26]. For this case, the disturbance can be injected by
an attacker once the information of the agent is transmit-
ted to its neighbors through the communication network. It
should also be noted that attacks on sensors and actuators
can be launched without physical tampering with the sys-
tem. For example, the global positioning system (GPS) of
an unmanned vehicle can be spoofed or the communication
channel from the controller to the actuator can be jammed.
Theorem 1 Consider the MAS (8) with the control protocol
(2). Let agent j be compromised by the attacker. Then, the
intact agents that are reachable from this agent are disrupted
from the desired consensus value.
Proof. The proof is similar to our proof of Theorem 1 in [44]
and is omitted. 
3.2 Internal Model Principle for the Attacker
In this subsection, we derive an internal model principle
for the attacker and analyze its adverse effects on the con-
sensus in distributed MASs. We show that in the leaderless
distributed MAS, an attacker can inject a state-independent
attack into sensors or actuators of a single root node to desta-
bilize the entire consensus process. These effects are ana-
lyzed using the frequency response of the MAS. A more
rigorous analysis is presented in the next section.
We now show that the attacker can design its attack signal,
instead of blindly injecting a disruptive signal, to maximize
the harm to the network.
Let the attack signal for agent i be generated by
f˙i = R fi, (10)
where R ∈ Rm×m. Define the set of the eigenvalues of the
system dynamic A defined in (1) and the set of the eigen-
values of the attacker dynamic R as
EA = {λA1 , . . . , λAn}
ER = {λR1 , . . . , λRm}
(11)
Lemma 1. [42], [46] Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Define
the set of root nodes asW ⊂ V and the left eigenvector of the
graph Laplacian matrix L for λ1 = 0 as w = [p1, . . . , pN]
T .
Then, pi > 0 if i ∈ W and pi = 0 if i < W. 
The following theorem shows under what conditions
the attacker can destabilize the network or cause a non-
emergent, but stable behavior. These conditions are ex-
ploited more in the next section and are related to attacks
on root nodes and non-root nodes.
Theorem 2 (Internal Model Principle for Attacker)
Consider the MAS (1) with the control protocol defined as
ui = cK
∑
j∈Ni
ei j
(
x j − xi
)
+ fi , (12)
with fi defined in (10). Let K be designed such that A−λiBK
∀i = 2, . . . ,N become Hurwitz, i.e., agents reach consensus
when fi = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,N. Then, injecting an attack signal
into the root nodes,
(1) destabilizes the MAS (1), if ER ∩ EA , ∅ and∑N
j=1 p1 j f j , 0 with ER and EA defined in (11).
(2) cannot destabilize the MAS (1), but causes a non-
emergent behavior, if
∑N
j=1 p1 j f j = 0 or ER ∩ EA = ∅.
Proof. Define the transfer function of the MAS (1) from
xi(s) to ui(s) as
G(s) =
xi(s)
ui(s)
= (sI − A)−1B . (13)
From (12), the global control signal vector can be written
as
u(s) = −(cL ⊗ K)x(s) + f (s) , (14)
with u =
[
u1
T , . . . , uN
T
]T
, x =
[
x1
T , . . . , xN
T
]T
and f =[
f1
T , . . . , fN
T
]T
. The overall state in terms of the transfer
function (13) becomes
x(s) = (IN ⊗G(s))u(s)
= (IN ⊗G(s))
[
−(cL ⊗ K)x(s) + f (s)
] . (15)
Let V be a nonsingular matrix such thatL = VΛV−1, with
Λ the Jordan canonical form of L. Since the right and left
eigenvectors of L corresponding to the zero eigenvalue are
1N and w, respectively, we define
V =
[
1 Y1
]
,V−1 =
 w
T
Y2
 ,
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with Y1 ∈ R
N×(N−1) and Y2 ∈ R
(N−1)×N [43]. Using L =
VΛV−1 and V−1V = IN , (15) turns into
[INn + cL ⊗G(s)K] x(s) = (IN ⊗G(s)) f (s)
⇒
[
INn + cVΛV
−1 ⊗G(s)K
]
x(s) = (IN ⊗G(s)) f (s)
⇒ (V ⊗ In) [INn + cΛ ⊗G(s)K] (V
−1 ⊗ In)x(s)
= (IN ⊗G(s)) f (s)
. (16)
Pre-multiplying (16) by (V−1 ⊗ In) and using xˆ(s) =
(V−1 ⊗ In)x(s) in (16) yields
[INn + cΛ ⊗G(s)K] xˆ(s) = (V
−1 ⊗ In)(IN ⊗G(s)) f (s) , (17)
which yields
xˆ(s) = [INn + cΛ ⊗G(s)K]
−1 [V−1 ⊗G(s)] f (s) . (18)
Assume V =
[
vi j
]
and V−1 =
[
pi j
]
. Then, the state trans-
formation yields
x(s) = (V ⊗ In)xˆ(s)⇒ xi(s) =
N∑
m=1
vim xˆm(s) . (19)
Equation (18) is a block diagonal system and the size of
each block is equal to the Jordan block corresponding with
an eigenvalue λi of L. Assume that all Jordan blocks in Λ
are simple. Then, from (18) for agent i one has
xˆi(s) = [In + cλiG(s)K]
−1G(s)
N∑
j=1
pi j f j(s) . (20)
Exploiting (19) and (20), the state of agent i can be rep-
resented by
xi(s) =
N∑
m=1
vim [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1G(s)
N∑
j=1
pm j f j(s) . (21)
The first eigenvalue of L is zero and its corresponding
right eigenvector is 1N , i.e., vi1 = 1∀i = 1, . . . ,N. Using this
fact, (21) turns into
xi(s) = G(s)
N∑
j=1
p1 j f j(s)
+
N∑
m=2
vim [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1G(s)
N∑
j=1
pm j f j(s)
. (22)
We now show that [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1 is Hurwitz and,
consequently, the second term of (22) is bounded, re-
gardless of the attack signal f j(s). To this end, we show
that the poles of [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1, i.e., the roots of[
det (sIn − A) + cλmad j(sIn − A)BK
]
, are identical to the
roots of the characteristic polynomial A − cλmBK. That
is [47]
det (sIn − (A − cλmBK)) = det(sIn − A + cλmBK) =
det (sIn − A) det
(
In + cλm(sIn − A)
−1BK
) ,
which by using (13), implies that
det(sIn − A + cλmBK) =
det (sIn − A) det (In + cλmG(s)K)
. (23)
Equation (23) shows that the eigenvalues of A−cλmBK are
identical to the poles of [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1. Since A−cλmBK
∀m = 2, . . . ,N are Hurwitz, therefore, [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1 is
also Hurwitz. Thus, the second term is bounded and has no
contribution in destabilizing the system dynamics.
Consider the transfer function for agent dynamics (1), and
the Laplace transform of the attacker dynamics (10) as
G(s) =
ad j (sI − A) B
det (sI − A)
, f j(s) =
ad j (sI − R)
det (sI − R)
f j(0) ,
where f j(0) is the initial value of the attacker.
Based on Lemma 1, p1 j in (22) is zero for non-root nodes.
Therefore, condition
∑N
j=1 p1 j f j , 0 can only be satisfied if
the attack is launched on root nodes. Assume that the attack
is on root nodes and the attack dynamic that generates f j(s),
i.e., the attack signal that is injected into a root node, has at
least one common eigenvalue with the agent dynamics, λAk .
Then, (22) can be expressed as
xi(s) =
N∑
j=1
p1 j
[
ad j(sI − A)
]
B
[
ad j(sI − R)
]
f j(0)(
s2 + λ2
Ak
)2 [ n∏
i=1,i,k
(
s2 + λ2
Ai
) (
s2 + λ2
Ri
)]
+
N∑
m=2
vim [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1G(s)
N∑
j=1
pm j f j(s)
i = 1, . . . ,N
.
(24)
Since λAk is on imaginary axis and has multiplicity greater
than 1 in (24), it results that in time domain (24) converges
to infinity as t → ∞ [48]. Therefore, this type of attack on a
root node destabilizes the entire network. This proves part 1.
For the proof of part 2, if
∑N
j=1 p1 j f j = 0, Then, (22)
becomes
xi(s) =
N∑
m=2
vim [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1G(s)
N∑
j=1
pm j f j(s) . (25)
As shown above, [In + cλmG(s)K]
−1 is Hurwitz and thus
xi(s) is bounded, regardless of the attack. However, the
agents that are in the path of the attacker deviate from the
consensus value by the amount of the attack signal f j(s).
On the other hand, if there is no common eigenvalue be-
tween system and attacker dynamics, i.e., ER ∩ EA = ∅,
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the multiplicity of poles located on the imaginary axis is
1 and therefore, based on (22), the state of agents remains
bounded. However, agents do not achieve consensus on the
desired value because of the attack’s effect. This completes
the proof. 
Remark 2. Consider a NCS under attack represented by
x˙i = Axi + Bui + B f fi .
Assume that the control protocol is given by
u = Kx ,
with x =
[
xT
1
, . . . , xT
N
]T
and u =
[
uT
1
, . . . , uT
N
]T
. The closed-
loop form, ignoring delays and packet losses, has the form
x˙ = Aclx + Bcl f .
The system response can be defined by
x (t) = eAcltx (0) +
∫ t
0
eAcl(t−τ) (Bcl f ) dτ ,
Since the closed-loop system Acl is stable, the system
response cannot be unbounded for a bounded attack signal.
This is in contrast to the synchronization in the distributed
MAS (1) in which A needs to be marginally stable, otherwise
agents states converge to the origin.
3.3 Attack Analysis: A Graph-Theoretic Approach
In this subsection, we use a graph theoretical approach to
analyze the effect of attacks. These results comply with the
results of Theorem 2, but reveal extra facts.
Define the set of root nodes and the set of non-root nodes
as
S r = {v1, . . . , vr}
S nr = {vr+1, . . . , vN}
. (26)
The graph Laplacian matrix L can be partitioned as
L =
Lr×r 0r×nr
Lnr×r Lnr×nr
 , (27)
where r and nr denote the number of root nodes and non-
root nodes, respectively. The Lr×r and Lnr×nr are Laplacian
matrices corresponding to the subgraphs of root nodes and
non-root nodes, respectively.
Lemma 2. [42] Let ∆ be a diagonal matrix with at least
one nonzero positive element and L be the graph Laplacian
matrix. Then, (L + ∆) is nonsingular. 
Lemma 3. Consider the partitioned Laplacian matrix (27).
Then, Lnr×nr is nonsingular and Lr×r is singular.
Proof. We first show that there exists at least a direct in-
coming link from the set S r to the set S nr defined in (26).
Assume by contradiction that there is no such link. Then,
none of the nodes in S r have access to nodes in S nr, which
contradicts the fact that S r is the set of root nodes. This vio-
lates Assumption 1. Consequently, the subgraphLnr×nr cap-
tures the interaction between all elements of S nr as well as
the incoming links from S r to S nr. The former is a positive
semi-definite graph Laplacian matrix L and the latter can be
captured by a diagonal matrix ∆ with at least one nonzero
positive element added to it. Therefore, based on Lemma 2,
Lnr×nr is nonsingular.
On the other hand, the subgraph of the root nodes is
strongly connected. This is because there is a link from each
root node to all other root nodes, by the definition of a root
node. We first show that there is no incoming link from the
set S nr to the set S r. Assume by contradiction that there is
such a link. Then, vi ∈ S nr has a path to all nodes in S r,
and since the subgraph of S r is strongly connected, it im-
plies that vi ∈ S r, which contradicts the assumption that
vi ∈ S nr. Therefore, the subgraph of root nodes is strongly
connected and standalone with no incoming link from other
nodes. Thus, Lr×r is singular [46]. 
Let p =
[
p1, . . . , pr, pr+1, . . . , pN
]T
be the elements of wT
1
,
the left eigenvector of L associated to its zero eigenvalue,
where [p1, . . . , pr] denotes the elements of w
T
1
associated to
the root nodes and [pr+1, . . . , pN] are those for the non-root
nodes.
Consider the MAS (1) with the control protocol (12) un-
der the attack signal (10). Define S A(t) = {e
λA1 t, . . . , eλAn t}
and S R(t) = {e
λR1 t, . . . , eλRm t} as the sets of natural modes
of the agent dynamic A and the attacker dynamic R, re-
spectively. Define the global state vector x =
[
x¯Tr , x¯
T
n
]T
,
where x¯r = [x
T
1
, . . . , xTr ]
T and x¯n = [x
T
r+1
, . . . , xT
N
]T denote
the global vectors of the state of root nodes and the state of
non-root nodes, respectively. Define the global attack vec-
tor f =
[
f¯ Tr , f¯
T
n
]T
, where f¯r and f¯n are the global vectors of
attacks on root nodes and non-root nodes as
f¯r = [ f
T
1 , . . . , f
T
r ]
T
f¯n = [ f
T
r+1, . . . , f
T
N ]
T
, (28)
Then, the global dynamics for (1) and global form of the
control protocol (12) can be taken in the form
x˙ = (IN ⊗ A)x + (IN ⊗ B)u , (29)
u = −(cL ⊗ K)x + f , (30)
In the absence of attacks, i.e., f = 0, a nonzero control
input u in (30) indicates a disagreement among agents and
their neighbors. This disagreement eventually goes to zero,
i.e., u → 0, indicating that agents reach consensus. That is
as t → ∞, x˙ → (IN ⊗ A)x. We call this the steady state of
agents.
In the presence of attacks, the following results show that
when u in (30) goes to zero, i.e., −(cL ⊗ K)x + f → 0,
although agents reach a steady state, i.e., x˙ → (IN ⊗ A)x,
they do not reach consensus. On the other hand, when u in
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(30) does not converge to zero, i.e., −(cL ⊗ K)x + f 6→ 0,
conditions on which the attacker can destabilize the entire
network or result in non-emergent behavior of agents are
provided. To this end, we show that if f < Im(cL ⊗ K) the
network never reaches any steady state, i.e., x˙ 6→ (IN ⊗ A)x.
It is also shown that if ER ⊆ EA, then, for a non-root node,
f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) and for a root node, f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) if∑r
k=1 fk = 0, otherwise f < Im(cL⊗K). We also show that if
f < Im(cL⊗K) and ER∩EA , ∅, then the network becomes
unstable.
Lemma 4. Consider the global dynamics of agents (29) with
the control protocol (30). Agents reach a steady state, i.e.,
x˙→ (IN ⊗ A)x, as t → ∞, if and only if f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K).
Proof. The global dynamic of agents (29) indicates that
agents reach a steady state, if and only if, −(cL⊗K)x+ f →
0. This condition is satisfied, if and only if, there exists a
bounded x such that −(cL⊗K)x+ f = 0, i.e., f ∈ Im(cL⊗K).
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 5. Consider theMAS (1) with global dynamics (29).
Assume that ER 1 EA. Then, f < Im(cL ⊗ K).
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let ER 1 EA but
f ∈ Im(cL⊗K). If f ∈ Im(cL⊗K), it implies that there exists
a nonzero bounded x such that −(cL ⊗ K)x + f → 0. This
concludes that the control signal u in (30) converges to zero,
which results in x˙ → (IN ⊗ A)x, and therefore, x˙i → Axi.
Using the modal decomposition, one has
xi(t)→
n∑
j=1
(r jxi(0))e
λA j tm j , (31)
where r j and m j denote the left and right eigenvector asso-
ciated with the eigenvalue λA j of the system dynamic A, re-
spectively. On the other hand, −(cL⊗ K)x + f → 0 implies
that
cK
∑
j∈Ni
ei j(x j − xi)→ − fi . (32)
The right-hand side of (32) is generated by the natural
modes of the system dynamic A whereas the left-hand side
is generated by the natural modes of the attacker dynamic R.
Based on our assumption, ER 1 EA which implies that the
attacker natural modes are different that the system natural
modes. Therefore, (32) cannot be satisfied and thus, f <
Im(cL ⊗ K), which contradicts the assumption. 
Lemma 6. Consider the global dynamics (29) and assume
that the attack signal is only injected into non-root nodes,
i.e., f¯r = 0, with f¯r defined in (28). If ER ⊆ EA, then,
f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K).
Proof. Note that, f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) if there exists a nonzero
vector xs such that
(cL ⊗ K)xs = f , (33)
where xs can be represented as the global steady state solu-
tion of (29). If (33) holds, then u = 0 and x˙s = (IN ⊗ A)xs.
This implies that xi ∈ span(S A).
Define xs = [x¯rs, x¯ns]
T , where x¯rs and x¯ns are the global
steady states of root nodes and non-root nodes, respectively.
Using (27), (33) becomes
 cLr×r ⊗ K 0r×nr
cLnr×r ⊗ K cLnr×nr ⊗ K

 x¯rs
x¯ns
 =
 0
f¯n
 , (34)
or, equivalently
{
(cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = 0
(cLnr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs + (cLnr×nr ⊗ K)x¯ns = f¯n
. (35)
As stated in Lemma 3, Lr×r is singular with zero as an
eigenvalue and 1r, its corresponding eigenvector, and Lnr×nr
is nonsingular. Consequently, the solutions to (35) can be
written as

x¯rs = c11r
x¯ns = (cLnr×nr ⊗ K)
−1
[
−(cLnr×r ⊗ K)c11r + f¯n
] , (36)
for some positive c1 and c. Equation (36) shows that
the steady state value of the non-root nodes is affected
by the attack signal value. If ER 1 EA, it results that
x¯ns ∈ span(S A, S R) which contradicts xi ∈ span(S A). There-
fore, condition ER ⊆ EA is necessary to conclude that for
any f = [0, f¯n]
T there exists a solution xs in the form of (36)
such that (33) holds, which implies that f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K).
The proof is completed. 
Theorem 3 Consider the MAS (1) with the control protocol
under attack (12). Assume that ER ⊆ EA. Then, f ∈ Im(cL⊗
K) if and only if
N∑
k=1
pk fk = 0 , (37)
where pk ∀k = 1, . . . ,N denote the elements of the left eigen-
vector of L corresponding with its zero eigenvalue.
Proof. We first prove the necessary condition. It was shown
in Lemma 6 that if ER ⊆ EA, then, f = [0, f¯n]
T ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K)
regardless of f¯n. Therefore, whether f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) or
f < Im(cL ⊗ K) depends only on f¯r . If f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K),
then, using (27), there exists a nonzero vector x¯rs for root
nodes such that
(cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = f¯r , (38)
where x¯rs can be considered as the global steady state of the
root nodes. Moreover, equation (38) holds, if ER ⊆ EA. Oth-
erwise, based on Lemma 5, f < Im(cL ⊗ K). As stated in
Lemma 3, Lr×r is strongly connected and singular. There-
fore, equation (38) has a solution when f¯r is in the column
space of (cLr×r ⊗ K). Since Lr×r is strongly connected, the
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row sums of Lr×r are all zero. Therefore, zero is one of its
eigenvalues with w¯1 = [p1, . . . , pr]
T , its corresponding left
eigenvector. Pre-multiplying (38) by w¯T
1
and using the fact
that w¯T
1
Lr×r = 0, one has
wT1 (cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = w
T
1 f¯r = 0⇒
r∑
k=1
pk fk = 0 . (39)
As stated in Lemma 1, pi = 0 for non-root nodes. There-
fore, (39) can be written as
∑N
k=1 pk fk = 0.
Now, we prove the sufficient condition by contradiction.
Consider f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) but condition (37) is not satis-
fied, i.e.,
∑N
k=1 pk fk , 0. Note that, f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K) implies
that there exists a nonzero vector x¯rs such that (38) holds.
Pre-multiplying (38) by w¯T
1
results in wT
1
(cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs =
wT
1
f¯r = 0 which holds if
∑r
k=1 pk fk = 0. This contradicts
the assumption. Therefore, f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K), if and only if
condition (37) holds. 
Theorem 4 Consider the MAS (1) with the control protocol
under attack (12). If the attack is on root nodes, then,
(1) All agents remain stable, but the network shows no
emergent behavior, if f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K).
(2) The entire network is destabilized when ER ∩ EA , ∅
and f < Im(cL ⊗ K).
Proof. The global dynamics (29) can be written as
x˙ = (IN ⊗ A)x + (IN ⊗ B)
[
−(cL ⊗ K)x + f
]
. (40)
One can see from the dynamics that if the second term
in (40) converges to zero, i.e., if f ∈ Im(cL ⊗ K), then, as
t → ∞, one has for the the agent dynamics x˙i → Axi, which
indicates their stability. On the other hand, f ∈ Im(cL⊗ K)
implies that cK
∑
j∈Ni
ei j(x j − xi) + fi → 0 and then, xi →
1
di
∑
j∈Ni
ei jx j +
(KTK)
−1
K
cdi
fi. Therefore, the state of the agent
under direct attack is deviated from the state of its neighbors
with a value proportional to fi. Using Theorem 1, the agents
that have a path to the compromised agents also deviate
from their real valued state and, therefore, the entire network
shows non-emergent behavior.
To prove Part 2, assume that there exists at least one
common mode between system dynamic A defined in (1)
and attacker dynamic R defined in (10), i.e., ER ∩EA , ∅. If
the attack signal f does not go away eventually from (40),
the entire network becomes unstable. This is because the
multiplicity of eigenvalues located on the imaginary axis
would be greater than 1. This situation happens, if and only
if, −(cL⊗K)x+ f 6→ 0, or equivalently, f < Im(cL⊗K). In
this case, f acts as an input to (40). Using Assumption 2 and
considering λAk ∈ ER ∩EA, conclude that the multiplicity of
the common poles related to λAk located on the imaginary
axis [48] are greater than 1. Therefore, it makes the MAS
(40) unstable. 
Remark 3. Attacks on sensors disrupt sensor measurements
and, consequently, the control protocol that uses this mea-
surement data generates erroneous commands for actuators.
Moreover, attacks on the communication links and actuators
also result in a wrong command generated by the control
protocol. For agents with multiple sensors and/or actuators,
if only one sensor or actuator of a root node is attacked and
the attacker satisfies conditions of Theorems 2 and 4, the
entire network becomes unstable.
Remark 4. The effects of an attacker on a network depend
on the attack signal dynamics. As shown in Theorem 2, if
an attacker does not have any knowledge of agent’s dynam-
ics, it cannot destabilize the network. However, the network
shows an emergent misbehavior. On the other hand, as stated
in Theorems 2 and 4, an attacker does not need to have the
full knowledge of the network topology and the agent’s dy-
namics to destabilize the entire network. Attack signal re-
quires having at least one common eigenvalue with agent’s
dynamics to make the entire network unstable. To this end,
an attacker can exploit the security of the network by eaves-
dropping and monitoring the transmitted data to identify at
least one of eigenvalues of the agent dynamics, then launch
a signal with the same frequency to a root node to destabi-
lize the entire network.
Define the local neighborhood tracking error for the MAS
(1) with the control protocol (2) as
εi =
∑
j∈Ni
ei j
(
x j − xi
)
, (41)
The global form of (41) becomes
ε = −(L ⊗ In)x . (42)
Theorem 5 shows that despite the presence of an attacker,
the local neighborhood tracking error (41) becomes zero for
intact agents if ER ⊆ EA.
Theorem 5 Consider the MAS (1) with the control input
under attack (12). Let the non-root node i be under attack.
Then,
(1) If ER ⊆ EA, then the local neighborhood tracking error
converges to zero for all intact agents.
(2) If ER 1 EA, the local neighborhood tracking error does
not converge to zero for agents that have a path to a
compromised agent.
Proof. It is shown in Lemma 6 that if ER ⊆ EA, then, f ∈
Im(cL ⊗ K). Therefore, using (42) one has
(cL ⊗ K)x = f ⇒ c(IN ⊗ K)ε = − f , (43)
or, equivalently
ckε j = − f j ∀ j = 1, . . . ,N . (44)
Since f j = 0 for intact agents, it implies that the local
neighborhood tracking error is zero for intact agents. This
proves Part 1.
We now use the contradiction to prove Part 2. Assume
that ER 1 EA and ε j → 0 for all intact agents, which
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concludes x˙ j → Ax j. This implies that x j is generated
by the natural modes of the system dynamic A, i.e., x j ∈
span{S A}. However, for the compromised agent i, one has
x˙i = Axi+cBK
∑
j∈Ni
ei j(x j − xi)+B fi, which denotes that xi
is composed of the natural modes of the system dynamic A
and the attacker dynamic R, i.e., xi ∈ span{S A, S R}. On the
other hand, ε j → 0 for the neighbors of the compromised
agent implies that
∑
j∈Ni
ei j(x j − xi)→ 0. Since the compro-
mised agent does not have the same dynamic as other agents,
ε j → 0 if and only if, fi has same dynamic with agents,
i.e., ER ⊆ EA, which contradicts the assumption. Therefore,
ε j 6→ 0 for the compromised agent and the intact agents that
have a path to it. 
The following uses Lyapunov method to show that for the
special case of the single integrator MAS, the local neigh-
borhood tracking error is zero for any constant attack. This
complies with the results of Theorem 5.
Lemma 7. Consider the graph Laplacian matrix L. Then,
ker(L + LT ) = ∅, if the graph is not balanced and ker(L +
LT ) = span{1N}, if it is balanced.
Proof. It is shown in [49] that
xT (L + LT )x =
N∑
i, j=1
ei j(x j − xi)
2 . (45)
From [ [49], Lemma 8], one has ker(L + LT ) ={
x| xT (L +LT )x = 0
}
. On the other hand, (45) implies that
xT (L + LT )x = 0, if and only if, xi = x j, ∀i, j = 1, . . . ,N.
This indicates that ker(L + LT ) ⊆ span{1N}.
We now show that if the graph is not balanced, xi =
x j = 0, ∀i, j = 1, . . . ,N is the only option and, therefore,
ker(L+LT ) = ∅. Assume that there exists a nonzero vector
x such that (L + LT )x = 0. Since ker(L +LT ) ⊆ span{1N},
therefore, x = 1Nc. That is, (L+L
T )1Nc = 0 or equivalently,
L1Nc + L
T1Nc = 0. The null space of the graph Laplacian
matrixL is 1N , i.e., L1N = 0, and this results in L
T1Nc = 0,
which is true if the graph is balanced. This contradicts the
assumption that the graph is unbalanced. Therefore, ker(L+
LT ) = ∅.
It is shown in [ [49], Lemma 9 and 11] that for the case
of a balanced graph, ker(L +LT ) = span{1N}. 
Theorem 6 Consider a MAS with single-integrator dynam-
ics as
x˙i = ui, i = 1, . . . ,N , (46)
and the control protocol (12) under attack f . Then, for a
constant attack, (−Lx + f )→ 0 as t → ∞.
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function candidate for the
MAS (46) as
V(x, f ) = (−Lx + f )T (−Lx + f ) . (47)
The attack signal is constant, therefore, f˙ = 0. Taking
the time derivative of the Lyapunov function candidate (47)
yields
V˙(x, f ) =
(−Lx˙ + f˙ )T (−Lx + f ) + (−Lx + f )T (−Lx˙ + f˙ )
= −(−Lx + f )T (LT +L)(−Lx + f ) 6 0 .
(48)
By LaSalle’s invariance principle [50], the trajectories
converge to the largest invariant set, S = {(x, f )|V˙(x, f ) = 0}.
Based on (48), V˙(x, f ) = 0 if

(−Lx + f ) ∈ ker(LT +L)
or
(−Lx + f ) = 0
. (49)
As stated in Lemma 7, ker(LT + L) = ∅ when the graph
is not balanced. Therefore, the only solution to the (49) is
−Lx + f = 0.
When the graph is balanced, based on Lemma 7, condi-
tions (49) become

−Lx + f = c1N
or
−Lx + f = 0
. (50)
Consider that the attack is only on non-root nodes. The
first equation of (50) implies that for root node i, one has∑
j∈Ni
(x j − xi) = c which results in x˙i = c and denotes that
the root nodes converge to infinity as t → ∞. This violates
the Theorem 1 because we showed in Lemma 5 that the
subgraph of root nodes is strongly connected without any
incoming link from non-root nodes and then, the attack on
non-root nodes cannot affect the root nodes. Therefore, the
only solution in this case is c = 0.
For the case of constant attacks on root nodes, one has∑
j∈Ni
[x j − (xi − fi)] = c. We showed in Theorem 2 that for
this kind of attack, the entire network converges to infinity,
i.e., xi = x j → ∞. Therefore, fi and c do not have any effects
on the state of nodes. Moreover, multiplying both sides of
the first equation in (50) by wT
1
, the left eigenvector of the
Laplacian matrix L corresponding to the zero eigenvalue,
yields
− wT1Lx + w
T
1 f = cw
T
1 1N ⇒
N∑
i=1
pi fi = c . (51)
As shown in Theorem 3, f ∈ Im(L), if and only if,∑N
i=1 pi fi = 0, which concludes c = 0. Therefore, the only
solution to (50) is −Lx + f = 0. 
4 Discussion
In this section, the adverse effects of attacks on root nodes
and non-root nodes are thoroughly discussed based on the
results from previous sections.
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4.1 Attack on root nodes
In this subsection, the adverse effects of attacks on root
nodes are discussed. It is discussed on some real-world ap-
plications that, in case of a short-duration attack signal on
a root node, the number of agents in the network has a sig-
nificant impact on its performance. It is also shown what
occurs if a root node is entirely compromised.
Corollary 1. Consider theMAS (1) with the control protocol
under attack (12). The entire network becomes unstable if
(1) ER ⊆ EA
(2)
N∑
k=1
pk fk , 0
Proof. Corollary 1 is the combination of Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4. 
Remark 5. An attack on only one root node makes the
entire network unstable, if the attack signal dynamics has at
least one eigenvalue in common with the agent’s dynamic.
This is because based on Theorem 4, attacks on root nodes
destabilize the entire network if the attack signals on root
nodes satisfies
∑N
i=1 pi fi , 0. For an attack on only one root
node,
∑N
i=1 pi fi = f j , 0, where j is the attacked root node.
Based on the results of Corollary 1 and Theorem 4, one
can conclude that existing disturbance attenuation tech-
niques, such as H∞ [41], fail to attenuate the adverse effects
of the attacker on the network performance. This is because
the goal in these approaches is to attenuate the effect of
disturbance on the local neighborhood tracking error. In the
presence of a stealthy attack, however, the state of all agents
converge to infinity simultaneously, and consequently, the
local neighborhood tracking error converges to zero eventu-
ally despite instability. On the other hand, existing mitiga-
tion techniques based on the discrepancy between the state
of the agent and its neighbors [25,32,51,52] might not work
for this type of attacks, as the agents state show the same
misbehavior and grow unbounded all together and, there-
fore, it might be impossible to identify the compromised
agent based on the discrepancy between an agents state
and its neighbors states. For practical applications, since
the state of all agents grows unbounded simultaneously,
one may have to shut down the entire network once the
states of agents exceed their permitted bounds. Therefore,
the reliability of root nodes has a very crucial role in pro-
viding resiliency for the network, and one would be better
to invest in making root nodes more secure. Novel resilient
and secure control protocols are needed to be developed for
these types of attacks.
In the case that the dynamics of the attack signal have no
common eigenvalue with the system dynamics, as shown in
Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, it cannot destabilize the network.
However, the entire network shows a misbehavior. The local
neighborhood tracking error is nonzero and, therefore, this
type of attack can be mitigated to some extent by the H∞
disturbance attenuation technique or game-based approach.
However, the H∞ technique is conservative and one needs to
develop novel detection and mitigation techniques to repair
and bring back the compromised agents to the network.
The next example clarifies the adverse effects of the attack
signal on root nodes.
Example 1. Consider 3 agents communicating with each
other according to the graph shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Communication topology.
The agents dynamics and control protocol are (46) and
(12), respectively. When Agent 1 is attacked, the agents
reach a steady state if
x˙1(t) = −(x1 − x2) + 1 = 0⇒ (x1 − x2) = 1
x˙2(t) = −(x2 − x1) = 0⇒ (x1 − x2) = 0
x˙3(t) = −(x3 − x2) = 0⇒ (x3 − x2) = 0
. (52)
However, this needs both (x1 − x2) = 1 and (x1 − x2) = 0,
which is impossible. Therefore, agents never reach a steady
state and converge to infinity.
The system is single integrator and when an attacker
forces a constant disrupted signal, i.e., ua = 1, into the root
node 1, using Laplace transform, one has
x1(s) =
1
s2
+
u(s)
s
+
x1(0)
s
, (53)
which implies that all agents tend to infinity. This confirms
the results of Theorem 2.
Now, let Agents 1 and 2 as root nodes be under attack so
that
∑2
k=1 pk fk = 0. Then, the steady state of agents can be
written as
x˙1(t) = −(x1 − x2) + 1 = 0⇒ x1 = x2 + 1⇒ x1 = 0
x˙2(t) = −(x2 − x1) − 1 = 0⇒ x2 = x1 − 1⇒ x2 = −1
x˙3(t) = −(x3 − x2) = 0⇒ x3 = x2 = 0⇒ x3 = −1
(54)
It can be seen from (54) that although agents do not tend
to infinity, they are disrupted from their desired value, which
complies with the result of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Note that although the results of Corollary 1 might require
a consistent attack signal, a short-duration attack, caused by
either an attack signal with a short-time duration or an at-
tack signal that is detected and removed, can also result in
a catastrophe. This type of attack on a root node has a per-
manent effect on the consensus value of the entire network.
The attacker, once removed, implicitly changes the initial
condition of the compromised agent. On the other hand, as
stated in Lemma 3, the subgraph of root nodes are strongly
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connected and, therefore, based on Theorem 1, the effect of
an attack signal on every root node propagates to all other
root nodes. Therefore, an attack on a root node, even after
it is removed, has permanent effect on the consensus value
and the agents can agree on a wrong value. The attack sig-
nal can cause the agent’s state to exceed their acceptable
and safe values in its short-duration and ,therefore, the entire
network might need to be shut down.
For this type of attack, the vulnerability of the network de-
pends on the ratio of compromised root nodes to intact root
nodes. For example, consider the demand-responsemanage-
ment application in smart grids for which agents communi-
cate to reach consensus on the aggregate power consumption
value [53–55]. In this application, there are possibly thou-
sands of agents and each agent needs to be a root node to
contribute to the aggregate power consumption value. There-
fore, if a small portion of nodes are attacked, the attacker
cannot deviate the aggregate value (for example the average
value) from its target value considerably. For a network with
a few number of agents, for example heading consensus of
a few number of vehicle, if only one root node is attacked
for a short period of time, it can significantly affect the con-
sensus value.
4.1.1 Fully compromised root node
In the case that a root node is entirely compromised, it
acts as an illegitimate leader. This is because it does not
listen to the other root nodes and therefore, does not update
its own information by the data received from its neighbors.
As stated in Lemma 3, the subgraph of root nodes is strongly
connected without any incoming link from non-root nodes.
Therefore, this node is the only root node in the network. In
such a situation, the compromised root node dictates its own
information to the entire network. This concludes that the
entire network is under the control of the attacker and agents
converge to the state provided by the illegitimate leader.
4.2 Attack on non-root nodes
In this subsection, the effects of attack signals on non-root
nodes are discussed.
Corollary 2. Attacks on non-root nodes, regardless of the
number of compromised agents and energy of the attack
signal, cannot destabilize the network.
Proof. As stated in Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, only attacks
on root nodes can destabilize the entire network. 
Corollary 3. Attacks on non-root nodes make the local
neighborhood tracking error zero, when the condition of Part
1 of Theorem 5 holds.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. 
The results of Corollary 3 indicates that existing H∞ atten-
uation techniques and game-based approaches cannot mit-
igate this type of attack. This is because the local neigh-
borhood tracking error is zero despite attack and this can
mislead the disturbance attenuation techniques.
In case that the attack signal has a short-duration, as long
as the attacker injects its adverse signal into the compro-
mised agent, agents that have a path to it cannot synchro-
nize. However, when it is removed, all agents will roll back
to the desired consensus value provided by root nodes. De-
spite, the effects of the attacker on the network performance
for a short period of time cannot be neglected and it can
cause a catastrophe.
The following example interprets the effects of an attacker
on non-root nodes.
Example 2. Consider 3 agents communicating with each
other according to the graph depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Communication topology.
Assume agents with dynamics and control protocol (46)
and (12), respectively.
Without any attack, the agents synchronize to the desired
value. In this case, it is the initial value of Agent 1. When
Agent 2 is attacked by injecting a constant and persistent
signal to its actuators as ua, then according to Theorem 1,
Agents 2 and 3 do not reach consensus and, in the steady
state, one has
x˙1 = u1 = 0⇒ x1 = 1
x˙2 = u2 = − (x2 − x1) + u
a = 0⇒ x2 = x1 + u
a = 2
x˙3 = u3 = − (x3 − x2) − (x3 − x1) = 0⇒ x3 =
x1+x2
2
= 1.5
.
(55)
This confirms that attacks on a non-root node only affect
other non-root nodes in the path of the compromised agents.
The local neighborhood tracking error for Agents 2 and 3 is
ε2 = x2 − x1 = 1
ε3 = x3 − x1 + x3 − x2 = 0
, (56)
which complies with Theorem 5 that the local neighborhood
tracking error is zero for all intact agents except compro-
mised agents.
Therefore, even though local neighborhood tracking error
is zero for intact agents, they do not converge to the desired
consensus value.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, a simulation example is provided to con-
firm our main results. Attack on both root nodes and non-
root nodes are discussed.
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Consider 6 agents communicating with each other by
graph topology shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Communication topology.
The dynamics of the agents are given by
x˙i =
 0 −1
1 0
 xi +
 1
0
 ui
i = 1, . . . , 6
, (57)
where ui is defined in (2). For simulation, Three types of
attacks are considered as follows

f1 = sin(t) t ≥ 20
f2 = sin(t) 20 ≤ t < 35
f3 = sin(10t) t ≥ 20
(58)
where f1 and f2 denote the long-duration and short-duration
attack signals with common eigenvalue with the agent’s dy-
namics and f3 is the long-duration attack signal without
common eigenvalue with agent’s dynamic.
5.1 Attack on Root Node
In this subsection, the effects of the attack signals on root
nodes are shown.
Assume that attack signal defined in (58) is injected into
Agent 1. The agent’s state are shown in Fig. 4. Fig. 4a re-
veals that the entire network converge to infinity for the
long-duration attack signal f1. It can be seen from Fig. 4b
that for the short-duration attack f2, once the attack is re-
moved, all agents reach consensus but to a wrong trajectory
because the attacker has changed the state of root nodes and,
therefore, network shows a misbehavior. Fig. 4c shows that
under the attack signal f3 all agents in the network show a
non-emergent behavior. However, agents do not converge to
infinity. These results are comply with Theorems 1, 2 and
4. Now, let Agent 1 be under attack signal f1 and Agent 3
is under attack signal (− f1) such that condition (37) in The-
orem 3 holds. It can be seen from Fig. 4d that agents do not
converge to infinity, however, because of the attack effect,
the network shows a non-emergent behavior. This is consis-
tent with Theorems 2 and 3.
5.2 Attack on non-Root Node
In this subsection, the effects of the attack signal on non-
root nodes are presented.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time(s)
-400
-200
0
200
400
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Agent 6
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time(s)
-50
0
50
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Agent 6
(b)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time(s)
-4
-2
0
2
4
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Agent 6
(c)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time(s)
-4
-2
0
2
4
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Agent 6
(d)
Fig. 4. Agent’s state, when attack signal is injected into Agent 1
(Root node). (a) Agent 1 is under f1. (b) Agent 1 is under f2. (c)
Agent 1 is under f3. (d) Agent 1 and Agent 3 is under f1 and (− f1).
Let Agent 2 be under the attack signal defined in (58). The
state and the local neighborhood tracking error of agents is
shown in Fig. 5. It is shown in Fig. 5a that Agents 2, 4 and 6
do not synchronize to the desired consensus trajectory. This
is comply with Theorem 1. However, as shown in Fig. 5b,
the local neighborhood tracking error for Agents 4 and 6
converges to zero and it is nonzero only for the compromised
Agent 2. This is consistent with the result of Lemma 6 and
Theorem 5. Now, let agent 2 be affected by the attack signal
f2. It can be seen in Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d that when the attack
signal is removed, Agents 2, 4 and 6 synchronize to the
desired trajectory, and the local neighborhood tracking error
converges to zero.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the adverse effects of an attacker
on the leaderlessMAS. It is shown that a compromised agent
propagates its adverse effects to all intact agents that are
reachable from it. Furthermore, we show that the attacker
can destabilize the whole synchronization process by inject-
ing only a state-independent attack signal to sensors or actu-
ators of a single root node or to its outgoing communication
links. The attacker does not need to have any knowledge
of the communication network or agents complete dynam-
ics to destabilize the network. It only needs to identify one
of system eigenvalues by eavesdropping and monitoring the
transmissions data to make the entire network unstable. We
call this the internal model principle for the attacker. These
attacks cannot be identified using existing model-based ap-
proaches and can destabilize the network quickly, and thus,
practically halt the whole synchronization process. The im-
portance of recognizing and characterizing these attacks is
that one can empower the agents with resilient controllers
to diminish them.
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Fig. 5. The state and the local neighborhood tracking error of
agents, when Agent 2 (non-Root node) is under the attack signal.
(a) Agent 2 is under the attack signal f1. (b) Agent’s local neigh-
borhood tracking error when the attack signal is f1 (c) Agent 2 is
under the attack signal f2. (d) Agent’s local neighborhood tracking
error when the attack signal is f2.
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